How do politicians with past military service decide on societal issues? We explore the voting behavior of parliamentarians in the informative institutional setting of Switzerland with a conscription army. Our setting allows controlling for voter preferences and party ideology. Results show that politicians who have served in the military do not differ from those who have not served when comparing their voting behavior on issues related to female welfare and welfare of the weak and disabled. However, politicians who have served in the military tend to have a higher probability to accept proposals on neutrality and a lower probability to accept proposals linked to international rights and the environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous political representatives around the world have served in the armed forces because of the widespread prevalence of conscript armies, past conflict situations, and military disputes. This is not only the case for non-democratic countries but also for democratic ones.
1 In electoral campaigns politicians sometimes advertise their experience or service in the military 2 as an asset for their political career and elected politicians are not completely neutral towards, and independent of, the military. Past personal experiences of different kinds, including military service, have been shown to shape a broad range of personal, educational, managerial and societal decisions (see, e.g., Washington 2008; Keller et al. 2010; Hayo and Neumeier 2012; Benmelech and Frydman 2015; Grönqvist and Lindqvist 2016) .
The political science and political economy literature has suggested that military service of political representatives may affect their opinions as well as voting on military issues (see Huntington 1957 and Nordlinger 1977 for seminal contributions or Stadelmann et al. 2015 for a recent analysis). However, the literature has been mostly mute with respect to effects of politicians' past military service on other policy fields apart from national security. We aim to address this gap and provide an explorative analysis of how military service is linked to policy decisions on societal issues at large. Such societal issues include policy proposals related to gender, neutrality, international rights or the environment.
Currently, there is little information on how military service influences actual voting behavior of politicians. We complement the literature by a new and relevant aspect using the informative setting of the Swiss conscription army. It is important to explore whether political decisions in numerous societal fields might be shaped by past military service (see, e.g., Geddes
1 Immediately, names like Dwight D. Eisenhower, Charles de Gaulle or Ariel Sharon immediately come to mind when thinking of political leaders with military experience from democratic states. 2 Take the race between John Kerry and George W. Bush as an example: Both served in the armed forces and highlighted that fact during campaigns, leading to so called "John Kerry military service controversy". served in the military because they see military service as a positive (negative) signal of quality.
This implies that voter preferences for specific societal issues need to be controlled for. 4 
(2)
Ideological preferences reflected by parties on specific societal issues are likely to affect individual voting decisions in parliament. At the same time, ideology regarding societal issues may affect whether politicians advanced in the armed forces. (3) It is not straightforward to classify political decisions into different societal areas such as issues affecting women, the weak and disabled, neutrality, international rights or the environment. It is even more difficult to classify decisions as either pro-or against women, pro-or against the weak and disabled or other societal groups and interests because decisions in parliament often represent compromises.
Ideally, we want to base the assessment of policy ramifications for different groups on an external classification which should be independent of politicians' choices. (4) While, serving in the military has been compulsory in many countries due to conscription requirements, advancing in the ranks is related to personal motivation (see Stadelmann et al. 2015) . We need to distinguish between politicians who served as soldiers due to conscription and those who have advanced to higher ranks. This allows to determine whether the voting behavior of politicians who served in the military is mostly due to personal motivation or not. Our empirical setting tackles all four of these challenges.
We look at the case of Switzerland. Swiss constituents regularly reveal their preferences for policies in popular referenda (see Schneider et al. 1981; Hessami 2016) . Referenda allow us to account for voter preferences. Politicians vote on the identical policy proposal in parliament as voters in referenda (see Portmann et al. 2012) . We control for party ideology with respect to different societal issues based on parties' official voting recommendations to "accept" or "reject" a policy proposal. Moreover, we measure the ideological position of individual politicians on a 4 Not controlling for what constituents want regarding specific societal issues might confound the task of politicians to represent their voters with their characteristics that they served in the military.
left-right dimension within their respective party blocks. Legislative proposals affecting women, the weak and disabled, neutrality, international rights and the environment are identified employing voting recommendations of five independent societal organizations. These organizations give "accept" or "reject" recommendations which can be used as indicators whether the proposals are pro or against women, pro or against the weak and disabled, etc. For all politicians of the Swiss National Council, we have data on personal characteristics, and in particular, whether they were conscripted to serve in the military. We also have information whether they advanced in the military and achieved higher military ranks which allows us to investigate whether motivation for the military plays a role for later voting decisions. Altogether,
our setting allows us to analyze how the military service and differences in military ranks are related to the voting behavior of politicians on diverse issues while controlling for voter preferences and ideological preferences of parties with respect to the identical policy issues while still holding constant other personal characteristics. We know of no other setting on voting with a similar precision regarding observational data on politicians and their voters.
Our results reveal new insights into how military service is associated with voting behavior:
We find that politicians who have served in the military do not vote any differently from those who did not serve with respect to female issues and issues affecting the weak and disabled.
However, having served in the military is associated with a higher probability of voting proneutrality and a lower probability of voting pro-international rights and pro-environment. All these results are independent of voter preferences and ideological preferences of parties as well as other personal characteristics or party affiliations. Refinements show that a politician's personal ideological position relative to their party peers only affects the influence of their military service for environmental policies. When exploring differences in military ranks as well as gender, we find that different military careers are differentially associated to voting behavior: The evidence suggests that simply serving in the military in the soldier ranks due to conscription does not systematically affect voting on societal issues. However, having chosen to serve in higher military ranks tends to be associated with a differential voting pattern. This is consistent with the view that motivation for the military affects voting.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II relates our contribution to the existing literature. Section III discusses our data and the empirical strategy. We present our empirical findings, robustness tests and refinements in Section IV, and conclude with Section V.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
This paper is related to two broad strands of literature.
First, it contributes to the growing economic literature that extends the classical spatial competition framework (see Downs 1957) Angrist and Krueger 1994) , consequences for education levels (see Lau et al. 2004 , Keller et al. 2010 , Card and Lemieux 2001 and managerial outcomes (see the recent publications by Benmelech and Frydman 2015 or Grönqvist and Lindqvist 2016) . We contribute to the literature by explicitly addressing the role of individual past military service on politician behavior. We explore voting differences for conscripted men. Due to personal motivation, some of them advanced in the military ranks and became officers. Personal motivation is likely to be a substantial factor in explaining their behavior (see Bachman et al. 2000) .
Second, our contribution relates to the broader literature on the interaction of the military, conflict attitudes, security policy issues and political institutions (see, among others, Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Dunne et al. 2008; Dunning 2011; Gebremedhin and Mavisakalyan 2013; OtoPeralias 2015; Schüller 2016) . While a few contributions in political science and political sociology turned their attention relatively early to the question of whether an individual's personal military service history affects the willingness to support military action, the political economy literature has been astonishingly mute with respect to the political role of military service.
Nevertheless, certain articles focus on the role of military service for decisions to engage in conflict (see, e.g., Weeks 2012; Horowitz and Stam 2014) . Other contributions suggest that military conservatism may contribute to a more cautious behavior with respect to the use of force (see Betts 1991; Gelpi and Feaver 2002) . Moreover, hawkish behavior in legislative decisions may be driven by self-selection into the military (see Bachman et al. 2000; Stadelmann et al. 2015) . For voting in general, party ideology is regarded as a major driving factor (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Hix et al. 2003) . Ideology has been suggested as relevant for military issues (see Lindsay 1990; Carsey and Rundquist 1999) . However, independent of ideology, economic interests play a role, too (see Fordham 2008) . We contribute to this literature by analyzing the link between military service voting on societal issues instead of limiting ourselves to military issues.
Our setting overcomes a general difficulty in the literature regarding the measurement of voter preferences (see, e.g., Lott and Davis 1992; Kau and Rubin 1993; Gerber and Lewis 2004; Lee et al. 2004; Bafumi and Herron 2010 Portmann (2014) provides an in-depth discussion on Swiss referenda, the parliamentary system and presents a number of analyses.
In general, referenda reflect revealed preferences of constituents as they allow them to compare legislative proposals against the status quo (see Schneider et al. 1981; Portmann et al. 2012; Stadelmann et al. 2013; Carey and Hix 2013) . A direct comparison between final votes and referendum decision has also been performed for the United States (see Brunner et al. 2013) 
Measuring party ideology and intra-party position
A further distinctive feature of our setting is related to the fact that we account for parties' ideological preferences with respect to specific policies. In Switzerland, parties proclaim voting recommendations for referenda. Thus, for all parliamentary decisions with subsequent referenda 6 We do not impute any values neither regarding the decisions of politicians nor regarding voter preferences. We stress this point because in the literature certain values (in particular regarding preferences) are usually approximated or imputed.
we directly measure the ideological position of parties by their voting recommendations, i.e. our data allows us to take account of the ideological positions for individual policy proposals.
Moreover, our data permits us to measure the ideology of individual politicians relative to their party peers. This intra party ideology measure is based on a NOMINATE score of each politician compared to the average NOMINATE score of her/his party and we construct a variable which indicates whether a politician is relatively right-leaning within the party. 7 Note that this measure is not referendum specific but it is specific for every politician in our sample. Even though, the referendum specific measure for party ideology we use which varies over politicians and policy proposals is superior to including an proposal-invariant score for politicians, we follow the received literature and account for it. We will also use this measure to analyze interactions with the recommendations of societal groups.
Identifying preferences for policy proposals of societal organizations and the army system
Parliamentary proposals often present compromises that conflate different demands by parties and societal interest groups in order to appeal to a majority. As such, they affect different groups and it is not straightforward to classify them into specific fields. Moreover, it is rare to observe policies which are clear-cut in the sense that they are clearly against or only in favor of a specific field, for instance, women or environment protection.
We resort to external judgments based on referendum voting recommendations by respected organizations which are considered as experts in their policy fields. More precisely, we collected the "accept" and "reject" voting recommendations of the following five associations: Alliance F for handicapped people (AGILE), the association for democratic solicitors or Greenpeace. These recommendations greatly overlap with those from the organizations that we have chosen. 13 We note that some high-ranking representatives of the respective groups may act as advisers to parliament and political parties. Nevertheless, the recommendations of these groups are disseminated as voting recommendations for the referenda only after the parliamentary decisions,
i.e. they do not targeted at parliamentarians. The recommendations refer to real policy projects.
They contrast with measures employed in the United States which rely on a set of strategically chosen, polarized issues such as ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) Scores for liberal and 8 Alliance F is the largest Swiss female association and regroups over 140 institutional members thereby representing over 400'000 women. The association is active in domains such as equality between men and women, family issues and the like. For further information see: http://www.alliancef.ch 9 AVIVO is the Swiss association for widows, invalids, old-age and orphans. It has been established in 1948.
The association has made its name by taking positions in favor of solidarity. Its positions figure in newspaper articles. For further information see: http://www.avivo-suisse.ch 10 AUNS is the abbreviation for "Association for an independent and neutral Switzerland". It has been established in 1986. It is often regarded as a relatively right-wing organization. However, there is no doubt that it strongly defends Switzerland's independence and neutrality. For further information see: https://auns.ch/ 11 For information on the Swiss section of Amnesty International see: https://www.amnesty.ch/ 12 For information on the Swiss section of the WWF see: https://www.wwf.ch/ 13 Our ultimate choice of organizations is linked to the number of voting recommendations they give.
conservative classifications or similar scores (see Snyder 1992) . As the voting recommendations are given by external organizations after politicians have voted in parliament and as they do not rank politicians, we treat them as exogenous in our empirical setting. Moreover, they are not related to the fact that politicians have served in the military or not. We recognize that ultimately any use of interest organizations to classify specific policies represents, to some extent, a subjective choice. However, this novel approach to classify issues offers more flexibility and richness than using, for instance, procedures such as NOMINATE. Those procedures capture only one (or few) dimension, while a vote by vote analysis treats every referendum as an independent dimension.
We measure military experience as having served in the Swiss Army. Switzerland's army is organized as a militia army of all able-bodied male conscripts between the ages of 19 up to 50 years for specific military duties.
14 While in the late 1950s almost all young men without physical disability served in the armed forces, approximately two-thirds of young Swiss men today are judged to be able-bodied. Military service is voluntary for women. In our empirical refinements, we take account of women specifically. 15 We show that our main conclusions do not change when restricting the sample to either younger or older politicians such that the different fraction of men conscripted over time is of no substantial relevance for our interpretations. 16 Detailed information on the Swiss military system is provided by Stadelmann et al. (2015) served; otherwise they are identical in terms of the voters they represent, their ideology, the parties they associate with, their personal characteristics, etc. A societal organization either recommends to accept or reject a specific referendum which is word-to-word identical to the respective legislative proposal that was voted on parliament. For each of the two types of politicians we estimate the probability of accepting instead of rejecting a proposal if either the societal organization suggests a) to accept or b) to reject the policy proposal. We then calculate the difference between a) and b) for both politicians. These differences in the probability to vote yes are compared for the two politicians, i.e. we compute the difference of the differences. An influence of the military service is observed, if the probability to adhere to the organization's recommendation differs between these two politicians. whether a specific organization recommended to "accept" or "reject" the policy proposal to voters in referendum r, e.g. if Alliance F recommends to vote yes, we denote the proposal as pro-female (identified takes the value of 1). If they recommend to vote no, the indicator takes the value of 0.
The association between voting recommendation and the probability of an individual politician to vote yes is, thus, captured by 3 . As the analyzed policy fields where organizations give voting recommendation tend to be disjoint, we analyze one field (the recommendation of one organization) after the other.
We are particularly interested in the coefficient of the interaction term 2 between having served in the military and the voting recommendation of a specific organization reflected by Most likely, politicians with military experience will rather select into right parties. Thus, we account for party fixed effects. Party ideology is a party referendum specific measure while partyfixed effects are not. We take account of district fixed effects to account for differences between electoral districts, regarding voter heterogeneity to avoid any selection issues as good as possible.
For the rest of the variables in equation (1), we follow the previous literature and include other personal characteristics which may be associated with the voting behavior of politicians. We take account of intra-party positions of MPs by employing NOMINATE scores along a left-right dimension. Even though, we account for party ideology, we want to ensure that results are not driven by politicians with a military service being always to the right or the left within their respective parties. Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in an online appendix (Table A1 ). The influence of these additional factors is reflected by the vector . stands for the error term. While we formulated equation (1) in terms of a linear probability model, we will estimate a logit model as the dependent variable is binary.
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We take account of numerous factors and only interpret the cross-difference of the observed voting outcome minus the cross-difference of the potential voting outcome ( 2 ). Nevertheless, there are three potential caveats that we would like to discuss: (1) Even though compulsory conscription exists, it is possible to avoid being conscripted. Moreover, some conscripted soldiers may advance in the military to higher ranks due to personal motivation. Thus, the coefficient should not directly be interpreted as an effect of conscription which persists far over 30 years (average age is over 52 years in our sample and conscription is at 18). Rather, it shows that 19 We shift for easier interpretation to a linear probability model when analyzing more interaction terms. In any case, both models provide qualitatively identical and quantitatively similar results (see appendix, Table A2 ).
politicians who served in the military, decide differently in parliament on societal issues.
Exploiting differences in military ranks in a refinement, the evidence suggests that it is motivation for the military (rather than only conscription) which affects serving in the military and voting for the military later on.
(2) While we take account for a large array of potential factors influencing political decisions and factors linked to military service, we cannot take account of cultural dimension which individual politicians or their voters might consider as relevant. Having spoken to active politicians, we are relatively confident that individual cultural understandings are likely to play a minor role.
(3) Although, we employ data on party ideology and take account the intra-party positions of MPs, there may still be unobserved dimensions of party ideology that our data does not directly capture and which may correlate with decisions of individual MPs.
It is worthwhile to discuss the external validity of our setting and whether our results may generalize. Importantly, politicians in our setting cannot simply follow the revealed voter We think that our setting is informative due to its high degree of detail.
IV. RESULTS

Baseline results
Table 1 provides our main results for five different policy areas. We always control for voter preferences (Voter preferences yes) and the ideological preferences of a politician's party (Party preferences yes). Even numbered specifications control for other personal characteristics, party group, canton, and legislature fixed effects.
Specifications (1) and (2) analyze voting patterns of politicians who served in the military in comparison to those who did not serve in the military with respect to female issues as identified by the voting recommendation by Alliance F. We do not observe any significant interaction term.
This suggests that politicians who served in the military are neither more pro nor more against female issues once controlling for constituents' preferences and party ideological preferences.
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Thus, serving in the military is not associated with any differential voting pattern on female issues. In particular, the sometimes-stated potential chauvinistic tendencies associated with the army are not relevant for parliamentary voting for the sample analyzed. 20 If we did not control for preferences and party ideology, we would also find an insignificant interaction term. We observe a statistically significant interaction term when analyzing politicians who served in the military and proposals which are pro-neutrality as identified by the Association for an independent and neutral Switzerland (AUNS) in specifications (5) and (6). This suggests that serving in the military is associated with voting more pro-neutrality. There is a common understanding among numerous citizens who served in the military that the army is a protector of neutrality. Therefore, we suspect the close link between Swiss neutrality and having a strong army to be a potential explanation for this result. We calculate discrete effects for the interaction terms We look at policy proposals affecting international rights as identified by Amnesty
International in specifications (7) and (8) percentage points less likely to accept a proposal which is pro-environment than politicians who did not serve. This is a surprising association, given that this effect is independent of party ideology. We will later show that it is mainly due to officers and noncommissioned officers and speculate that motivation for the military correlates with a more skeptical stance on the environment independent of other ideological believes.
In summary, we do not have any indication that having served in the military systematically affects voting on female issues and issues related to the weak and disabled in society. At the same time, there is some evidence that politicians who served in the military tend to vote rather for neutrality, they rather tend to vote more against an extension of international rights policies and policies that are classified as pro-environment. All results are independent of constituent preferences, the party's ideological position on the specific issue as well as party fixed effects and other control variables. We note that all results remain qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar when estimating a linear probability model (see Table A2 in the online appendix).
Moreover, when estimating separate samples of older (above or equal median age of sample) and younger (below median age of sample) politicians, we find similar results too such that our overall interpretations do not change (see Table A3 in the appendix).
22 22 As today a lower fraction of men are considered able-bodied and are required to serve in the military than in the past, splitting the sample insures that our results are not driven by such differences.
Robustness -Controlling for within-party position and right-wing politicians
In specifications (1) to (5) in Table 2 Table 1 . ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of <1%, 1-5%, and 5-10%, respectively.
Going one step further to rule out the influence of right-wing ideology, we only look at politicians from left and center parties in specifications (6) to (10) as politicians who served in the military might rather affiliate with right-wing parties. Again, our baseline results remain relatively robust for this subsample. We do not observe any change in the sign of the coefficients.
Interestingly, the interaction term between (Served in the military) and (Proposal pro-female) turns marginally significant (i.e. politicians who served tend to support pro-female propositions)
while the interaction term between (Served in the military) and (Proposal pro-neutrality) loses significance.
Refinements -Military ranks and voting with party or government
We provide refinements of our analyses in Table 3 and Table 4 with a linear probability model. 23 We always include all constituent terms of the interaction terms. Table 3 starts by analyzing military ranks in specifications (1) to (5). Conscription is compulsory in Switzerland such that all able-bodied man have to serve in theory. However, advancing to higher military ranks depends on selection and personal motivation (see Bachman et al. 2000; Stadelmann et al. 2015) . 24 Moreover, it should be noted that conscription may be avoided by trying to be classified as incapable for military service. Thus, even in the case of conscription, motivation for the military could play a substantial role. This implies, that previous results should not be interpreted as the effect of conscription which prevails for over 30 years with respect to societal decisions. Rather they are informative, that politicians who have served in the military act differently in parliament regarding some societal policies. 23 We employ a linear probability model here to make the coefficients of diverse interaction terms more easily comparable to the reader. Our qualitative and quantitative findings do not change systematically when employing a logit model instead. 24 Of course, not every soldier can advance to become a non-commissioned officer or an officer but it also depends on the army's willingness to advance the person. Nevertheless, those who advance can be seen as persons who are more motivated for the military and there tends to be an undersupply of soldiers willing to advance to higher ranks. Table 1 . ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of <1%, 1-5%, and 5-10%, respectively.
Our setting allows us to explore, however, whether the observed difference in behavior of politicians also driven by motivation for the military. To do so, we explore differences in military ranks. Supposing that all able-bodied men are conscripted, serving as a soldier can be seen as a potential effect of conscription. However, advancing to higher military ranks is rather due to personal motivation.
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Numerous politicians in our sample have served in higher ranks than the soldier ranks. To analyze differences between compulsory military service and selection due to motivation to higher military ranks, we distinguish politicians who chose to advance in the military, namely officers and noncommissioned officers from those who only served as soldiers due to conscription. 26 Our results show no specific pattern such that both compulsory service and motivation are likely to play some role when politicians who served in the military vote in parliament on societal issues.
We find, nonetheless, the following four interesting patterns: (1 We further explore the heterogeneity of the findings regarding personal characteristics in specifications (6) to (10). We interact the policy proposals with another factor, namely a politician's sex. We do this to analyze differences between men and women as women do not have to serve in the military and no women in our sample has a military experience. Again, our overall results do not change systematically but four further interesting findings emerge: (1)
Female politicians seem to be no different to officers when voting on female issues. In fact, officers and female politicians have a higher probability to support pro-female policies than all other politicians. (2) Female politicians are less likely to support pro-neutrality proposals. (3) Officers and noncommissioned officers oppose pro-environment policies while females support pro-environment proposals more than men who did not serve in the military. (4) Politicians who served in the soldier ranks are not different to men who did not serve but both groups are different to female politicians on proposals regarding females, neutrality and the environment. Note that when estimating a sample of only male politicians, i.e. excluding women from the sample entirely, we find similar results again (see Table A4 in the appendix).
The fact that politicians who only served as soldiers are comparable to men who did not serve at all points to motivation to achieve higher military ranks instead of an effect of conscription: Having to perform compulsory service and not advancing in the military due to personal motivation does not systematically affect later voting behavior on different societal issues, i.e. the results do not suggest any systematic socialization men serving due to conscription in comparison to men who did not serve. On the other hand, men who advanced in the military were motivated to do so and this motivation may be related to their later voting behavior. Thus, the results are driven rather by motivation for the military than due to compulsory military service which is consistent with Bachman et al. (2000) and Stadelmann et al. (2015) .
In Table 4 we further extend our explorative analysis by two potential differences between politicians who served and those who did not serve in the military. Table 1 apart from controls for age and time in office. ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of <1%, 1-5%, and 5-10%, respectively.
